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I
INTRODUCTION
As an attempt by Congress to overturn a Supreme Court ruling by statute,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), although passed by a con-
gressional landslide, was one of the most controversial pieces of legislation
passed during the Clinton presidency.1  Enacted by Congress in 1993, RFRA
was intended to add a degree of protection to religious practices by requiring
courts to  evaluate facially neutral, non-religion specific statutes using the com-
pelling interest test.2  By enacting the statute, Congress attempted to overturn a
prior Supreme Court decision3 by mandating how all courts must decide free
exercise cases.  In 1997, however, the Supreme Court ruled that RFRA was an
unconstitutional congressional usurpation of the judiciary’s power to interpret
the Constitution.4  RFRA remains noteworthy, however, because of the means
utilized by a dissatisfied Congress to overturn the Court.  Instead of adhering to
the amendment process outlined in the constitution, Congress, via a statute, ef-
fectively not only overturned a prior Supreme Court ruling, but also expanded
constitutional rights beyond the Court’s recent interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.
This note examines RFRA from a law and economics perspective to show
that, as a method by which Congress attempted to impose its definition of a
constitutional right upon the courts, the Act was inefficient.
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1. The current issue of Law and Contemporary Problems explores various aspects of the Consti-
tution and constitutional interpretation during the Clinton Administration.  This note adds to the ex-
ploration by examining, from a law and economics perspective, the attempt by Congress to expand the
rights protected by the Constitution through the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993)).
2. See Elizabeth C. Williamson, City of Boerne v. Flores and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: The Delicate Balance Between Religious Freedom and Historic Preservation, 13 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 107, 113 (1997).
3. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a facially neutral law of gen-
eral applicability is constitutional as long as it only incidentally burdens one’s religious beliefs).
4. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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II
RFRA’S SHORT HISTORY
RFRA represented an attempt by Congress to restore the compelling inter-
est test articulated in Sherbert v. Verner,5 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,6 for all cases
in which religious freedom was substantially burdened.7  In Sherbert, the appel-
lant was denied unemployment compensation after refusing to work on Satur-
day, the Sabbath Day for her faith.  The Court found it unacceptable that the
appellant had been forced to choose between violating a religious tenet and re-
ceiving unemployment benefits, and ruled that this conditioning of receipt of
benefits unduly burdened her free exercise of religion.8  The Court likened this
burden to a fine imposed on the appellant for worshipping on Saturdays.9
In Yoder, the Court applied the Sherbert standard in granting Amish chil-
dren an exception to a Wisconsin law requiring children to attend school until at
least the age of sixteen.  The Court concluded that the law, as applied in this
case, was directly at odds with the purpose of the First Amendment and inter-
fered with the “fundamental tenets” of the appellants’ religion.10  As in Sherbert,
the Court held that a facially neutral statute may not unduly burden the free
exercise of religion unless there is a compelling governmental interest.11
Nearly two decades after Yoder, a closely divided Court held that a facially
neutral, generally applicable law is not unconstitutional even though it inciden-
tally burdens one’s religious beliefs.12  In Employment Division v. Smith, two
Native Americans had been terminated from their employment as private drug
rehabilitation counselors for ingesting the illegal hallucinogen peyote, as part of
a sacrament in their religion.  Because the Employment Division concluded that
they had been terminated for misconduct, the two were denied unemployment
benefits.13 Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Scalia stated that to im-
pose the compelling interest test in such cases would elevate religious doctrine
above general law, thereby producing a “constitutional anomaly” in the form of
a “private right to ignore generally applicable laws.”14
Smith likely would have resulted in an identical outcome even under the
compelling interest test.  The government would have had little difficulty estab-
lishing that full enforcement of its narcotics laws represented a compelling in-
5. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
7. See Eugene Gressman, The Necessary and Proper Downfall of RFRA, 2 NEXUS J. OP. 73, 76
(1997).
8. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-05.
9. See id.
10. 406 U.S. at 218.
11. See id. at 220.
12. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
13. See id. at 874-75.
14. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
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terest.15  Indeed, Smith distinguished Sherbert and Yoder because they did not
involve conduct prohibited by law.16
Unhappy with the decision in Smith, Congress “moved quite literally to sub-
stitute as ‘law’ the view of the dissent in the case,”17 passing RFRA, which read,
in part, as follows:
(a) In general Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of relig-
ion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided
in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demon-
strates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.18
Because it was directed at courts hearing free exercise cases, RFRA created a
“statutory right where the Court declined to create a constitutional right.”19  As
such, RFRA was not a constitutional guarantee of rights, but merely a legisla-
tive guarantee.20  The Act, therefore, was not binding on Congress:  It retained
the authority either to appeal or override RFRA.21
Congressional victory was short-lived, however.  In the first RFRA claim
brought before the Supreme Court, the Act was invalidated for going so far be-
yond the congressional prerogative of protecting constitutional rights that it
created constitutional rights.22  RFRA was a curiosity in that it had no power to
deter future legislatures from statutorily overruling or nullifying it, and yet it
claimed the authority to bind the Supreme Court.  If Congress can mandate
precisely how the courts will review the constitutionality of statutes, then the
Constitution becomes indistinguishable from ordinary law.23  Although the leg-
islature can nullify the Court’s misinterpretation of a statute by amending the
statute, the transaction costs associated with this process are significantly higher
than those associated with judicial interpretation, and, in order to maximize ef-
15. See Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative
Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 276 (1994).
16. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876 (failing to note that Smith, like Sherbert, was an unemployment
benefits case).
17. William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L. J. 291, 306 (1996).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1993).
19. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV. 221, 246.
20. See Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppres-
sion of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1295, 1308 (1998).
21. See id.
22. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
23. See id.
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ficiency, courts should “have much more leeway in interpreting the Constitu-
tion.”24
III
RFRA FROM A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
In order to have a firm understanding of RFRA, one must be familiar with
some aspects of the free exercise claims it was intended to facilitate.  Free exer-
cise claims are more likely to be successful if they merely reduce the sacrifice
necessary on the part of the believer than if they make the believer better off
than the nonbeliever.25  That is, courts are suspicious of ulterior motives in
bringing such claims.  If a successful claim would leave the individual better off
than others with different religious convictions (for example, allowing one to
use peyote when others not affiliated with the faith may not), there is a greater
chance of claimants bringing suit for ulterior motives.  For instance, in Sherbert,
Mrs. Sherbert made a value choice between honoring her religious convictions,
by not working on Saturdays, and retaining her job.26  She was not necessarily
better off relative to others because she may very well have wanted to have
worked Saturdays in order to earn additional income.  By protecting her em-
ployment, the Court allowed Mrs. Sherbert to limit her religious sacrifice to
Saturday earnings, rather than risk total unemployment.  Though seemingly
analogous on the facts, Smith is quite different.  In Smith, if the appellants had
been confronted with the necessity of choosing between peyote use in a cere-
monial manner or maintaining employment, it is not at all certain that they
would have chosen the latter.  Had the Smith appellants prevailed, they would
have been better off than non-believers, for whom peyote use would still be il-
legal.
Free exercise claims also have a higher likelihood of success if the claimants
seek a benefit of meager value to nonbelievers, such as the right to wear a yar-
mulke while playing high school basketball.27  In these cases, there is little risk of
ulterior motive on the part of the claimants,28 a risk that is particularly prevalent
in cases like Smith, which sparked RFRA’s enactment.  To allow the use of nar-
cotics in religious ceremonies gives rise to the possibility that groups will engage
in illicit drug use under the pretense of religious necessity.  In United States v.
Bauer, for example, Rastafarians, under RFRA, challenged convictions for pos-
session and conspiracy to manufacture and distribute marijuana, arguing that
such use and manufacture was central to their religion.29  The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the conspiracy convictions, saying that “the religious freedom of the de-
24. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263, 291 (1982).
25. See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Relig-
ious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 52 (1989).
26. See id. at 51-52.
27. See id. at 52.
28. See id.
29. 84 F.3d 1549, 1556 (9th Cir. 1996).
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fendants was not invaded” because “[n]othing before [the court] suggests that
Rastafarianism would require this conduct.”30 Many such claims from groups or
individuals affiliated with nontraditional religious sects could have been antici-
pated had RFRA been allowed to stand.
Perhaps the best-known examples of religious practices conflicting with
state law are the cases upholding antipolygamy laws in the face of free exercise
claims.31  In Potter v. Murray, the United States District Court for the District of
Utah ruled that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect the practice of polyg-
amy.32  The Tenth Circuit affirmed, utilizing the compelling state interest test in
holding that though the freedom to believe is absolute, freedom to act is not ab-
solute, and a state has a compelling interest in enforcing its criminal code.33
It is unlikely courts will ever have much difficulty in holding that the en-
forcement of criminal laws is a compelling state interest,34 which makes RFRA
all the more of a curiosity.  Smith held that a generally applicable neutral law
that only incidentally prohibits the performance of a religiously required act
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.35  This rule is necessary to balance the
competing goals of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause be-
cause any exception that would exempt religious groups from the criminal code
would amount to the establishment of religion by the federal government.36
Herein lies RFRA’s fatal flaw:  If free exercise claims exempt individuals in
certain circumstances from generally applicable laws, then religion becomes, in
effect, subsidized.37  If no such exemptions exist, then individuals, relative to
others not of the same religious persuasion, will neither gain nor lose rights be-
cause of their religious practices.  For example, in Smith, the appellants’ relig-
ious affiliation would not enlarge or diminish their right to smoke peyote.
A. RFRA Was a Statute, Not an Amendment
Legislation can be viewed much like any other good supplied on the market.
According to the “interest group” theory, for example, legislative protection is
provided to those groups that derive from it the greatest value, regardless of
overall social wealth.38  Under this theory, small, well-organized interest groups
can appropriate to themselves disproportionate benefits from the political proc-
30. Id.
31. See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 20, at 1298.
32. 585 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Utah 1984).
33. See Potter v. Murray, 760 F.2d at 1070 (10th Cir. 1985);  Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
34. See Idleman, supra note 15, at 276.
35. See Employment Div. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
36. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that a “governmental preference
for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment”).
37. The prevailing view is that the government is prohibited  from either advancing (a lower
threshold than attempting to actually “establish” religion) or retarding religion.  In economic terms,
religion is advanced through subsidization and retarded through taxation.  See McConnell & Posner,
supra note 25, at 2.
38. See Posner, supra note 24, at 265-66.
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ess.39  This leads to socially inefficient laws, because members of more diffuse
groups with less specific goals are often correspondingly less adamant in op-
posing a tight-knit organization’s push for legislation.40
Thus, rationally behaving interest groups will have incentives to maximize
their gains from potential legislation while minimizing their costs.  Interest
groups have four primary means by which to engage in rent-seeking41 with the
government.  First, an interest group can petition the executive branch by “lob-
bying for changes in administrative regulations and enforcement practices.”42
Second, an interest group may attempt to persuade courts “to interpret statutes
or constitutional provisions in a manner consistent with [the group’s] goals,” 43
either by investing in litigation or by attempting to influence the process of judi-
cial selection.44  Third, and at more cost to an interest group, rent-seeking may
take the form of lobbying the legislature for the enactment of a statutory provi-
sion.45  Finally, and at most cost, an interest group may campaign for a constitu-
tional amendment.46
RFRA was the result of the third approach—lobbying the legislature for the
enactment of a statute.  Yet RFRA violated a major check in the separation of
powers inherent in the Constitution by statutorily mandating the standard by
which courts could evaluate free exercise claims.  RFRA effectively inserted an
additional provision into the Constitution—namely, that such claims would
stand unless the state demonstrates a compelling interest in abridging that right
and furthers that interest in the least restrictive manner possible.  In City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court denied the constitutionality of this provi-
sion.
The compelling interest test is a judicial invention, designed to facilitate the
difficult process of interpreting the Constitution where the Framers’ intent is
less than clear.  Though courts are not more inherently capable of accurately in-
terpreting the Constitution than legislatures, this responsibility has been be-
stowed upon them for very pragmatic reasons.  Perhaps the principal reason is
the relative independence of the judiciary.  That is, because federal judges are
appointed for life and thus not subject to reelection, their advancement is as-
sumed to be less correlated to their decisions.47  In short, federal judges have no
39. See John O. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective,
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 202 (1997).
40. See id.
41. Rent-seeking is “the purposeful pursuit, through the political process, of above-normal profits.”
Michael E. DeBow, The Social Costs of Populist Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective, 14 HARV.
J.L.& PUB. POL’Y 205, 214 (1991).
42. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 116 (1993).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 117.
46. See id.
47. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
4, 8 (1987).
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need for a base of support supplied by interest groups and lobbyists.  Therefore,
legal protections of the welfare of those in the minority48 are more likely to be
enforced by judges than by legislators.49  The judicial decisionmaking authority
protects those whose rights are infringed by statutes pushed through by rent-
seeking interest groups.
RFRA was an attempt by organized religious groups to usurp judicial deci-
sionmaking authority and to reap the benefits normally associated with a consti-
tutional amendment while only expending the resources required of a statute.50
In an economic sense, lobbying for a constitutional amendment is likely to be
more costly than lobbying for a statute.51  For example, interest groups advo-
cating an amendment immediately bear the costs of seeing an amendment
through to ratification, but the benefits of the amendment may accrue only in
the long run.  Thus, future benefits of the amendment must be discounted to re-
flect the time value of money.52  Of particular importance is the risk of addi-
tional costs to repeal the amendment in the event its judicial interpretation is
unexpected.53
As a general rule, “[i]f the benefits of amendment are greater than the costs
of obtaining one, a group will opt for constitutional change,” but “if the added
cost of constitutional protection exceeds the added benefit for an interest
group, that group will pursue statutory protections.”54  An economically rational
interest group, however, will not pursue an amendment—even if its benefits ex-
ceed its costs—if those same benefits can be realized at lower costs.55
RFRA would have reduced the future costs of securing certain rights
through litigation.  For instance, if it is known that the right to use peyote in a
religious ceremony will be judged under the more favorable (from the perspec-
tive of the religious organization) compelling governmental interest test,56 an in-
terest group might elect to incur the costs of litigation with little risk of failure.
While this may seem to be efficient prospectively, it is uncertain what implica-
tions RFRA would hold for prior Court rulings that had not been decided un-
48. “Minority” frequently does not refer to a numerical minority, but rather to the amount of po-
litical influence exerted by opposing groups.  Therefore, a minority interest might be one held by a
majority of the population, if that majority is too diffuse to resist the passage of legislation advocated
by a strong and influential interest group.  See id. at 10.
49. See id. at 8.
50. See H.R. REP. NO. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (stating that RFRA’s purpose is creating “a
statutory right requiring that the compelling governmental interest test be applied in cases in which the
free exercise of religion has been burdened”).
51. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 42, at 117 (theorizing that “amendments cost more be-
cause they require more lobbying and other expenditures than statutes”).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 118.
55. See id.
56. This is highly doubtful.  The government would probably have had little difficulty establishing
that full enforcement of its narcotics-related laws is a compelling interest.  See Idleman, supra note 15,
at 275-76.
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der the compelling interest test, giving rise to the possibility that many issues
would have to be relitigated.
The religious freedom cases used a variety of review standards.  Under the
test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman—the one used in the “establishment of
religion” cases—a statute must have a secular purpose, have a principal or pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion.57  This has been criticized as
an inherently unworkable doctrine.58  Justice Scalia, lamenting its invocation in
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,59 stated that
“[l]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after repeatedly being killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little
children and school attorneys.”60  Scalia also noted that six of the current nine
justices have, when they have seen fit, “personally driven pencils through the
creature’s heart.”61
These Establishment Clause cases remain uncertain because the Court itself
is unsure of how much of a religious purpose must be found before a statute will
be invalidated.62  Justices Scalia and Rehnquist both “reject the purpose prong
of the Lemon Test in its entirety,” while other Justices argue that “a statute may
be constitutional if it is motivated in part by religious purposes,” but they do not
agree as to where the line should be drawn.63  All this is to say that the law re-
garding religious liberty is an excessively tangled web.
It is unclear what effect RFRA would have had on this web of case law.  It
seems apparent, however, that the doctrine of stare decisis would have con-
flicted with its application, as such a substantial expansion of rights under the
Free Exercise Clause would have necessarily intruded upon the domain of the
Establishment Clause.  Would cases decided under the Lemon test no longer
have any precedential effect?  Currently, with the Court rather sporadically ap-
plying the Lemon test, there may be times when a new claimant will be uncer-
tain as to which standard will be applied to his case.  Still, many settled issues
could have been expected to have been re-litigated under RFRA, and it is
doubtful that the costs saved in those new uncertain cases (that could be en-
sured a compelling interest standard) would outweigh the costs incurred in reli-
tigating old issues decided under different standards.
57. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
58. See Stephen G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
463, 468-69.
59. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
60. Id. at 398.
61. Id.
62. See Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation
and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 89, 125 (1990).
63. Id.
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B. RFRA’s Textual Ambiguities
RFRA required that the government not “substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion” unless the government could demonstrate that the burden
was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and [was] the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”64  Yet
Congress provided little guidance about how to interpret the terms “compelling
interest” and “substantially burden.”65  Although RFRA stated that the com-
pelling interest test is that set forth in prior federal court rulings and that it pro-
vides “a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests,”66 this assumes that courts have
clear, well-defined standards for recognizing a compelling interest.  As this of-
ten may not be the case, there is no reason to assume RFRA would have re-
sulted in fewer cases being litigated.  Indeed, it is likely that only the focal point
of the litigation would have changed.
Under RFRA, courts asked whether a compelling state interest was present,
and, if so, whether the restriction on religious practice was the least burden-
some possible.  Courts were by no means uniform in their application of RFRA.
For instance, a Wisconsin court ruled that the state could not prohibit prisoners
from wearing religiously significant jewelry,67 but an Iowa court held that a pris-
oner could be denied the opportunity to witness a baptismal ceremony because
these actions did not touch upon religious practices that were “mandated” by
the faith or “central” to a religious tenet.68  In a case analogous to Employment
Division v. Smith,69 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that because Rastafarians could not show that the distribution of mari-
juana was required by their faith, they could not challenge their conspiracy con-
victions under RFRA.70  The Court found error, however, in the lower court’s
failure to require the government to show that that the application of the mari-
juana laws to the defendants on the possession charges was the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.71
As mentioned above, RFRA noted that the compelling interest test utilized
in past federal court rulings was “a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”72  Prior
court rulings, however, never adequately explain what constitutes a compelling
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1993).
65. See Idleman, supra note 15, at 274.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
67. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F.Supp. 1429, 1432 (W.D. Wisc. 1995), vacated by 521 U.S. 1114
(1997).
68. See Weir v. Nix, 890 F. Supp. 746, 768 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
69. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
70. See United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming convictions for con-
spiracy to distribute, possession with intent to distribute, and money laundering, but remanding to al-
low religious defense for possession counts).
71. See id.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
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state interest.  Indeed, the standard is intended to be sufficiently flexible to al-
low courts to interpret it more or less restrictively as they see fit.73  Courts have
had a tendency to find a compelling interest when issues arise in the military,
criminal, or prison context,74 but RFRA did not purport to limit itself to any
specific contexts.75
RFRA also failed to define the term “burden” or its modifier “substan-
tially.”76  Courts interpreting RFRA were required to look to existing case law
to construe the terms or, that failing, simply to fashion a definition that seemed
suitable.77  “At best, this doctrinal uncertainty and analytical manipulability
[would] cause RFRA to be interpreted in unpredictable and inconsistent ways”
and, at worst, would “endow RFRA-resistant judges with a powerful means by
which to interpret the Act narrowly.”78
This wide latitude of judicial discretion under the Act not only could result
in little meaningful protection for religious minorities, but would also increase
the total cost to society due to a rise in the number of cases litigated contesting
the interpretation of such terms as “compelling interest” and “substantial bur-
den.”  To illustrate this point, by the date of the Flores decision—only five years
after RFRA’s enactment—state and federal courts had heard a total of 168
RFRA challenges.79  In challenges to state prison policies, claimants were
granted relief nine times and denied relief eighty-five times.  In all cases, relief
was granted twenty-five times and denied 143 times, for a relief percentage of
approximately fifteen percent.80  Thus, the possibility of additional protection
appeared to inspire claims, the vast majority of which were unsuccessful.  Many
of these claims likely would not have been brought had the law as articulated in
Smith (which held that a facially neutral, generally applicable law that inciden-
tally burdens one’s religious beliefs is constitutional) remained in effect.
The more specific a rule is, the less costly it is to apply.  With a clear, meas-
urable objective standard against which a statute may be compared, relatively
little cost is associated with interpretation.  Certainty sacrifices flexibility, how-
ever, which is particularly desirable in a rule with the widespread applicability
of RFRA.  If the rule had been narrowly tailored to overturn Smith with regard
to peyote use, for example, the dangers associated with textual ambiguities
73. See Idleman, supra note 15, at 275.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Schumucker, 815 F.2d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting free exercise
claim regarding mandatory selective service registration on the ground that government has a “compel-
ling interest” in quickly conscripting citizens into service should doing so prove necessary); Faheem-El
v. Lane, 657 F.Supp. 638, 645-46 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that institutional security provided a compel-
ling interest for restricting prisoners from wearing religious emblems and holding separate religious
services).
75. See Idleman, supra note 15, at 276-77.
76. Id. at 266.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 271.
79. See Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress was Wrong and the Court was Right—Reflections on City of
Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 802 (1998).
80. See id. at 803.
WHEELER_FMT2.DOC 12/04/00  8:44 AM
Page 573 : Winter/Spring 2000]ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RFRA 583
leading to inconsistent court rulings would not be present.  RFRA, however,
was a very broad act and purported to reach any free exercise claim.
Despite its intended purpose of strictly limiting judicial interpretation in free
exercise cases, RFRA gave surprisingly little guidance to judges attempting to
apply it in good faith.
C. The Uncertainty of the Rights Secured by RFRA
The most pointed criticism of RFRA, articulated by the Supreme Court in
Flores, is that it lacked the necessary proportionality between the means (the
statutory remedy) and the ends (the right being protected).81  RFRA’s stated
purpose was to restore the pre-Smith free exercise regime by prohibiting the
government from either intentionally or inadvertently substantially burdening
the free exercise of religion unless the government could show that it had em-
ployed the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.82
Simply put, the Smith case implemented a purpose test for religious discrimina-
tion (allowing incidental burdens upon religion), and RFRA was an effort to
replace the purpose test with an effects test that would give consideration to the
purpose of the contested governmental regulation.83
Congress has no authority to define or redefine constitutional rights, but it
can prescribe remedies for existing rights.84  If, in interpreting the Constitution,
the judiciary also defines the rights that are to be protected, then these rights,
under a “rights essentialist theory,” 85 are value judgments of the courts and not
bona fide constitutional rights.86  According to this theory, these constitutional
rights represent a form of judge-made constitutional common law.87
If constitutional rights are derived from common law, then from a tradi-
tional law and economics perspective, the goal would be simply to optimize the
number of constitutional breaches.  But would that optimal number be zero,
making violations so frequent that remedies would come to be regarded pri-
marily as compensatory fines and not as punitive sanctions?88  The optimal
number of true constitutional violations would, of course, be zero and remedies
would, of course, be punitive.  However, if courts are allowed to add fundamen-
tal rights to be protected under the umbrella of the Constitution, the number of
violations will correspondingly increase.  An inevitable over-enforcement of
these judicially crafted rights would lead to the subjection of too many persons
to the stigma of penal actions for violating constitutional rights, until such penal
actions and stigma were so diluted that the original document-created rights
81. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 530.
82. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 864 (1999).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 864-65.
85. See id. at 861.
86. See id. at 865.
87. See Posner, supra note 47, at 37.
88. See Levinson, supra note 82, at 859-60.
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would no longer be adequately protected.  This is perhaps the most obvious
danger inherent in enforcing questionable rights, and a compelling reason for
resolving such doubtful constitutional claims (claims not arising from the text of
the document) against the claimant.89
Given that the source of rights and the source of remedies originate in two
different branches of government—and that remedies are concrete statutory
declarations—over-inclusive remedies will often effectively create additional
constitutional rights. Thus, when rights are created by two separate branches,
and these rights differ, then from either perspective, the contested rights will
appear to be either under- or over-enforced.
The under-enforcement theory posits that federal courts do not always en-
force constitutional rights to their fullest.90  When Congress takes note of this, it
may fashion a “remedy” designed to protect not only the court-recognized
right, but also rights it perceives to be inherent in the Constitution.  Thus, Con-
gress remedies judicial under-enforcement with legislative over-enforcement.
RFRA is such an example of Congress over-enforcing a right, or, alterna-
tively, fashioning a right where none existed.91  Given this problem, to whom
should deference be given?  In this case, is the efficient solution a post-Smith
under-enforcement by the Court or a post-RFRA over-enforcement by Con-
gress?  This inquiry begs the question of whether the right to religious freedom
was under-enforced at all following Smith.  Quite simply, “the power to inter-
pret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the judiciary.”92  If
Congress were authorized to infringe upon this power of the judiciary, the Con-
stitution would no longer be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordi-
nary means.”93  Once the Court establishes how it interprets the right to be pro-
tected, any attempt by Congress to alter this interpretation leads to a new right
in place of the original, and, by extension, the original right is left unprotected.94
To allow Congress and the judiciary to share this interpretive power would
only lead to increased uncertainty as to what rights are protected by the Consti-
tution.  If Congress creates a statutory right courts are unwilling to enforce,
claimants who would have benefited from the additional protection are in a
worse position after incurring the costs of mounting an unsuccessful claim than
they would have been had they known at the outset that no claim existed.  This
is precisely what occurred with RFRA before the Flores decision.95
RFRA did not expand free exercise rights; rather, it made those rights less
certain.  While a clear constitutional right must be enforced, uncertain rights
89. See Posner, supra note 24, at 284.
90. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: the Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978).
91. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 508 (stating that “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what that right is”).
92. See id. at 524.
93. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
94. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 508.
95. See Lupu, supra note 79, at 802-03.
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“should be denied; [and] doubts should be resolved against the claimant,” so
that protection of the more firmly entrenched rights will not be diluted.96  When
the concept of fundamental rights is stretched to include rights without firm
constitutional roots, the compelling interest standard serves only to “prevent se-
rious consideration of any possible justifications for the challenged statute.”97  If
a compelling state interest is shown when infringing on a fundamental right
produces the greatest good for the greatest number,98 then this supposedly high
bar of protection is reduced to nothing more than a simple cost-benefit analysis.
Such may occur when courts are given the leeway to interpret the ambiguous
terms “compelling interest” and “substantially burden.”  Protecting these judi-
cially created rights gives rise to the inherent danger that no constitutionally
created rights can rise above this cost-benefit analysis.
It follows that any over-protection of free exercise rights resulting from
RFRA is a fiction, because these rights are nonexistent unless enforced by the
courts.
IV
CONCLUSION
Could RFRA have been worded so as to achieve its purpose in an efficient
manner?  As a single act designed to alter the way all such cases must be de-
cided, probably not.  Though religious organizations of all sorts banded to-
gether to lobby for the enactment of RFRA, they might have fared better by
lobbying for their own specific causes of action.  Though the united approach
minimized transaction costs to the individual organizations, the results would
likely have been disappointing to many such groups.
In the Smith case concerning the use of peyote in religious ceremonies, for
instance, the Court could easily have found that the state had a compelling in-
terest in enforcing its narcotics laws. A narrowly tailored statute, on the other
hand, that legitimized peyote’s use during the ceremonies of a recognized re-
ligion that deems such use essential to its practice would likely have achieved
the desired result.  Here, Congress would not be altering or adding to the Con-
stitution, but merely abridging other statutes.  These narrowly tailored rules,
while perhaps initially more expensive, would also be less likely to spurn exces-
sive litigation questioning the reach of the statute as a whole or the interpreta-
tion of certain key words or phrases central to its application.  Any resulting
litigation would be confined to the more narrow reach of the statute, reducing
the number of litigants affected by the statute’s reach.
Finally, in the tradition of Coasean bargaining,99 if interest groups have a
firm understanding of what their rights are under the Constitution, they may
96. Posner, supra note 24, at 284.
97. Id. at 287.
98. See id.
99. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
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more effectively lobby for statutes from which they might benefit.  With peyote,
for example, if Congress and the Court have different opinions as to what rights
exist, then it is unclear by what means one would attempt to alter the existing
rule.  It was this tension that contributed to RFRA’s failure.
